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Abstract:  In  Vietnam,  many  government  announcements  have  gathered  negative
receptions from the public. Among them, Ms. Nguyen Thi Kim Tien, Vietnam Minister
of Health, has received more of it. Through the case study of Ms. Kim Tien’s many
scandals  during  the  2013-2014  period,  this  study  is  interested  to  see  if  the  health
scandals eventually elevated into a government crisis, how they affected the minister’s
reputation, and what she could have done to better respond to the public. This study
examined news articles on such health scandals to confirm whether the health scandals
indeed  escalated  to  be  a  government  crisis.  It  also  identified  the  advantages  and
disadvantages of Ms. Kim Tien’s responses in restoring her reputation to the public to
understand what factors contributed to public dissatisfaction toward the minister. This
study  concluded  that  poorly-managed  health  scandals  eventually  elevated  into  a
government crisis and greatly affected the minister’s reputation. It is suggested that PR
is what the government  needs to deal with such situations.  The research also leaves
room  for  a  quantitative  approach  to  the  case  to  increase  the  result’s  validity  and
representativeness. Until now, as the health issues and the resignation appeals are still
needed, the crisis management effort should get more attention from the government,
and such study is needed to better understand the situation  
Keywords: government crisis, assessment, reputation management, image restoration, Vietnam,
case study
1. INTRODUCTION
A  measles  outbreak,  Asian  Games  hosting  decisions,  and  34-trillion-VND  education
initiatives  are  among  a  series  of  heated  events  that  have  affected  the  Vietnamese
government’s  reputation during the 2013-2014 period. The social  impacts of these events
have drawn attention to government officials’ reactions, especially to their public responses.
According  to  Lan  Huong  (2014a),  from  2013  to  the  present,  many  government
announcements  have gathered negative receptions  from the public.  Among the politicians
with unwelcoming feedback, Ms. Nguyen Thi Kim Tien, Vietnam Minister of Health, has
received more of it. According to Kim Linh (2013), the minister’s responses to the media
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were typically regarded as shocking, unthoughtful, irresponsible and begging the question.
Consequently, the recent measles outbreak, together with previous health scandals and crises,
led  to  mounting  pressure  that  Ms.  Kim  Tien  should  resign  because  her  reactions  and
announcements to these events widely displeased the public. To add to the objections, Ms.
Kim Tien flatly refused to resign and provided no explanations for the behavior (Truong Son,
2014).  While  a  politician’s  foremost  goals  should  be  to  protect  his  or  her  image  and
strengthen the public’s trust in them, Ms. Kim Tien and other Vietnamese politicians failed to
do these things due to lack of strategic planning and practice in communicating with the
public.
Through the case study of Ms. Kim Tien’s many scandals during the 2013-2014 period, this
study is interested to see if the health scandals eventually elevated into a government crisis,
how they affected the minister’s reputation, and what she could have done to better respond
to the public. The paper examined news articles on such health scandals by analyzing themes
of  the  events,  the  minister’s  responses,  media  reactions,  and public  feedback  to  confirm
whether the health scandals indeed escalated to be a government crisis and should have been
treated more carefully as a government crisis. The paper also inspected the articles further to
identify  the  advantages  and disadvantages  of  Ms.  Kim Tien’s  responses  in  restoring  her
reputation  to  the  public,  to  find  a  theme  in  the  responses  and  understand  what  factors
contributed to public dissatisfaction toward the minister.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Government crisis
According to Lee (2009), a government crisis differs from a corporate crisis in both nature
and scope. The government is always under the public eye; it has a duty to report decisions
and actions to citizens. It requires a high level of responsibility and delicate communication
skills. A crisis in this sector can face a degree of both public and media scrutiny that far
exceeds  a  normal  corporate  crisis,  which  can  lead  to  a  loss  of  public  trust  towards  the
government (Lee, 2009; Liu, Horsley & Levenshus, 2010).
Liu and her colleagues (2010) stated that public perception of a government’s communication
effort has a major effect on a crisis management outcome. As a result, during a time of crisis,
government officials have a greater need to satiate the information thirst of the public than a
corporate in crisis does. The government feels more pressure to meet the public’s information
needs, and thus has to communicate more frequently and more effectively (Liu et al., 2010).
Moreover, the media’s reaction to government officials is also different from the reactions to
corporates. Not only do government responses tend to be covered significantly more often
than those  of  corporate  entities  in  the  media,  but  the  responses  also  are  evaluated  more
negatively (Liu et al., 2010). Hence, the complexity of a crisis result poses a need to clearly
define what a government crisis is to better address and respond to it.
In the case of Ms. Kim Tien, in the 2013-2014 period, Vietnam faced elevations in hospital
fees, violations in medical ethics, vaccine frauds, and an uncontained measles outbreak. At
first,  the issues appeared as rumors and scandals, but they soon escalated into crises that
shook the health sector. Poor management of the crises by the Ministry of Health caused
public trust to quickly deteriorate. This paper argues that the main issue that occurred when
the government could not resurrect that trust was that the health crises became government
crises, leading to withdrawal of public support toward the government.  The first research
question that guides this paper is thus formed as follows:
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RQ1: Did the examined health scandals collectively escalate into a government crisis?
Crisis management in a government crisis
According to Novak and Barrett (2008), a government crisis, especially a crisis for a public
health  organization,  involves  communicating  with  interested  parties  about  the  nature,
magnitude and significance of the issue. When a crisis happens, government authorities face
heightened  public  and  media  scrutiny.  The  media  promptly  seeks  information  and  will
attempt to gather input from different organizational members.  Additionally,  citizens now
have new media, which empowers them to be more involved and communicative during a
crisis. With new media, a crisis can spread to a global audience more easily than ever. Novak
and Barrett (2008) and Xiao (2008) recommended that governments should thus designate a
spokesperson during a crisis  to assure the public,  express willingness  to  assess the crisis
situation  and  progress,  announce  if  the  government  has  any  countermeasures  and  avoid
secrecy. These steps are vital to uphold the public trust in an uncertain and complex situation
like a crisis. Novak and Barrett (2008) believed that formal leader of an organization can be
the best choice as the spokesperson. It is the spokesperson’s job to maintain the trust and
credibility of the government and if necessary, admit fault and accept responsibility.
In the case of Ms. Kim Tien, the continuous poor information about the industry caused the
public to place their  contempt on the one they thought to be responsible,  the Minister of
Health. Media articles about the minister received a number of shares and negative comments
across  social  media  platforms.  Nevertheless,  the  minister’s  responding  statements  to  the
media were only denials and evasions throughout the scandals. An example of this behavior
appears in the article “I can’t resign” (2014). The issues largely affected Ms. Kim Tien’s
reputation  and  led  to  an  online  petition  for  her  resignation,  which  had  received  12,000
signatures by June 2014 (“Minister of Health,” n.d.). To understand more about the crisis
management effort of the minister, the second research question is formed as follow.
RQ2: During the examined health scandals, how did the minister’s responses affect  her
reputation to the public?
A similar health-related government crisis in the region is Hong Kong’s SARS crisis. Lee
(2009) employed eight assessments to see if the Hong Kong government handled the incident
well  or poorly,  which are (1)  The issue demonstrates the government’s ineffectiveness  in
crisis  prevention  and  containment,  (2)  The  issue  magnifies  the  government’s  existing
problem in public communication management, (3) The government faces intensified media
scrutiny, (4)  The handling process recalls collective memories of previous crises, (5)  The
issue is perceived as a thematic, regular happening, (6) The communication management is
reflected as the government’s commitment to the public good, (7)  The issue magnifies the
bureaucratic nature of the government, and (8) The political, economic and social contexts
affect the government’s decision. These assessments will be used to evaluate Ms. Kim Tien’s
effort during the measles outbreak.
Public relations for Vietnam government
In 2014, Lan Huong’s interview series with Mr. Nguyen Si Dung, Vice Chairman of the
National Assembly Office, and Mr. Le Quoc Vinh, journalist and PR specialist, chairman of a
leading  communication  group  in  Vietnam,  was  conducted  to  understand  more  about  the
nature  of  the  Vietnam  government’s  communication.  Lan  Huong’s  (2014a)  interview
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revealed that most government officials do not care much about reputation or how to manage
it.  While  Western  politicians  pay  more  attention  to  their  reputation  because  they  are
appointed  through  public  election,  in  Vietnam,  the  party  selects  the  candidates  and  the
citizens vote based on these few selections. This selection makes it easier for a candidate to
win without having to build public trust. Further, Vietnamese culture encourages people to be
modest  and  discreet,  limiting  public  appearance;  even  the  politicians  still  embrace  this
pattern.  Additionally,  most  Vietnamese  politicians  tend  to  avoid  the  media  and  public
opinion.  They  are  afraid  of  traditional  media,  social  media,  and  of  public  speaking.
According to Lan Huong (2014b), some politicians stated that they fear dropping the ball and
delivering soundbites that the media will use against them. Therefore, government officials
generally disregard the issue of reputation management. They are usually not interested in
citizens’ feedback. No earlier than when a crisis occurs do they seek to solve the problem. As
a result, the way the government authorities currently lead and react makes the public feel
that  authorities  can  talk  and do all  they  want,  regardless  of  mass  opinions  (Lan Huong,
2014a). 
3. METHODOLOGY
Case study
The method used in this research is qualitative case study, which is an intensive, in-depth
interpretation and analysis of a phenomenon, as Merriam (1998) defined it. A qualitative case
study  aims  primarily  to  develop  insight  into  and  interpret  a  phenomenon,  not  to  test
hypotheses.
Based on their  overall  intent,  Merriam (1998) further  categorized  case  studies  into three
types: descriptive (provides detailed description of the studied phenomenon, which may later
be used for hypothesizing or theoretical assumption testing), interpretive (interprets rich data
to develop concepts, and/or to support or challenge theories held before data gathering) and
evaluative (describes  and explains  information  to  evaluate  and  produce  judgment  on  the
studied phenomenon).  This case study of Ms. Kim Tien is an evaluative case study, as it
analyzed the media  information to  develop a better  understanding of the scandals  and to
weigh each of the minister’s responses.
Case background
In July 2013, three newborns died shortly after their births, only minutes after receiving their
routine Hepatitis B shots. Photos of grieving parents were shown across the media, which
caused sadness and fear across the nation about the quality of vaccines. This case was not
directly blamed on Ms. Kim Tien until she refused to pay a visit to the parents while she was
in town, and the cause of death was left unanswered. The Ministry of Health claimed “there
was no proof [that the Hepatitis B shots were to blame]” (Bich Van, 2013). As a result, an
online petition calling for the minister’s resignation was spread across social media outlets.
As discussed by Cam Quyen, (2013), a number of medical mishaps that occurred later in the
year  continued  to  erode  people’s  faith  in  the  health  sector.  It  was  detected  that  a  major
hospital  in  Hanoi  had  cloned patients’  blood test  results  for  years.  By throwing away a
patient’s blood sample and using the available results, the hospital caused a public uproar
about medical ethics. The worst case in the sector soon followed. A woman died during an
operation  with  a  well-known doctor  from Vietnam’s  largest  hospital.  Her  death  was  not
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reported and the doctor threw her body into a river to get rid of any evidence. These two
cases, together with some minor scandals of doctor corruption and health worker neglect,
never saw a thorough solution on how to renovate the health sector’s organization and uphold
ethics. 
The second wave of demands for Ms. Kim Tien’s resignation started in April 2014, when a
national measles outbreak was reported. In all provinces, almost 21,000 cases were reported
(Quoc Thanh, 2014). Despite many doctors’ suggestions, the Ministry of Health delayed the
public  announcement  of  the  outbreak,  and  in  a  media  briefing,  the  minister  blamed  the
incident  on citizens’ poor vaccination awareness,  overcrowded hospital  conditions (which
caused cross-infections) and on the climate changing, instead of taking proper responsibility
and seeking solutions (Truong Son, 2014). Although there was strong pressure for her to
resign, Ms. Kim Tien refused to step down.
Data analysis
To respond to the first research question, which investigates whether the examined health
scandals collectively escalated into a government crisis, this paper examined the most recent
scandal for Ms. Kim Tien, which was the measles outbreak. As public reactions had mounted
from the previous scandals and collectively hurt the health minister’s image, this is when the
public followed the government even more closely. All of the articles selected for study were
arranged in chronological order. The measles outbreak is the most recent scandal for Ms. Kim
Tien. The researcher analyzed the stories, the authors’ word choice, as well as the readers’
comment sections in the articles to see if the measles outbreak was assessed properly and if it
has escalated into a government crisis. 
The author consulted local media repository for media coverage on the case. Keywords used
include  “measles  outbreak,”  “Kim  Tien”  and  crisis,  in  both  Vietnamese  and  English
languages.  All articles returned from the keywords  were read to further identified if they
actually described the case.
Among the articles found, as data for RQ1, this paper used fifteen pieces of media coverage
on the measles  outbreak on  Tuoi Tre (5 articles),  Tuoi  Tre News (which is  the former’s
English  subsidiary  and  contained  2  articles),  VnExpress (4  articles)  and  Thanh  Nien (4
articles). As stated by the Golden Communication Group (2013), these publications are the
leading  and  most  prestigious  media  in  Vietnam.  They  are  generally  regarded  as  more
objective,  impartial  and credible than other news sources, and thus their articles are more
reliable for study. The time frame for this data set is from April 1-30, 2014, which was the
period of the measles outbreak. 
To answer the  second research  question,  which  looked for  how the  minister’s  responses
affected her reputation to the public during the examined health scandals, all of the minister’s
responses  to  the  media  were  extracted  and  categorized  into  Benoit’s  (1995)  five  image
restoration strategies,  which will  be described in  the Results  and discussion section.  The
responses were further analyzed to see if the minister showed any passionate involvement in
the issue. The public comments on the articles were also used to support the argument that
the minister’s reputation suffered due to responses, to reflect the mass feedback. 
Data for RQ2 were taken from one medium, Tuoi Tre (and its subsidiary, Tuoi Tre News), to
understand  whether  the  minister’s  responses,  the  medium’s  interpretation  and  public
feedback changed over time, and how. The data included all media coverage on the health
scandals, and all the readers’ comments and feedback to the articles. The analyzed period is
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from July 1, 2013 to April 30, 2014, which included all the aforementioned health scandals
for which the Minister of Health was blamed.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
How the measles outbreak should have been assessed
In  their  study  on  government  decisions  in  crises  and  crisis  management,  Rosenthal  and
Kouzmin (1997) proposed a five-step framework for government decision-making process
during a crisis, which can help a government to assess the seriousness of an issue or a crisis,
and to see if a decision is necessary. To answer RQ1, this paper followed these five steps to
assess the measles outbreak and to weigh if the minister’s reactions were appropriate.
Step 1: Assess whether the crisis poses a threat to the existing social-political system
If the incident has a broader implication, if it is challenging the government’s function and
development,  it  has to be taken more seriously and rapidly.  In this case, even though the
infant deaths from measles first appeared in only some provinces, there was a high chance of
an outbreak since measles is an infectious disease. Additionally, the series of health-related
cases in the prior year  made the public keep a closer eye  on the heath officials;  another
uncontrollable scandal could be a fatal blow to the Ministry. Therefore, the first hints of the
outbreak should have been handled more seriously.
Step 2: Assess the necessity to respond
According to Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997), government also needs to decide whether to
provide a response to the public, to restore the situation to its previous, stable state, or to
adapt and innovate as appropriate. In this case, a need to provide a measles containment plan
before the public was much needed. Since the doctor’s recommendation to publicly announce
the outbreak appeared  on media,  and since the deaths  were publicly reported,  the  public
agenda was fixed on Ms. Kim Tien for a proper response. Thus, the delay in announcement
could only be accepted if the minister had provided a reasonable explanation and an action
plan for both health workers and the public during the measles outbreak. However, her early
denial of the outbreak possibility and her delayed actions (Truong Son, 2014) proved that she
had failed at this step.
Step 3: Assess the necessity of a government response
Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997) further described that if a response is needed, the government
must make a proper one. They stated that if government officials do not have the capability
and responsibility to respond, a wrong involvement may negatively affect crisis management.
The researchers recommended that a capable and knowledgeable spokesperson should take
the task, not just anyone from the government. In this case, the minister received the most
public attention and she was the main person to speak for the Ministry; nevertheless, many of
her  responses  were  heavily  criticized.  On  the  minister’s  defense  that  everyone  makes
mistakes  and people need to  understand for  the health  sector’s oversight  (in the measles
case), among the heated replies was the following, quoted in Nguyen Mi (2014) in  Thanh
Nien:
I think the minister was wrong. We all know that everyone makes mistakes, but we have to
distinguish between unforeseen mistakes and mistakes from incapability and irresponsibility.
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This statement indicated that the minister was not the right person to speak for herself and the
Ministry. She should have designated a spokesperson to better reassure the public.
Step 4: Decide how promptly the decision should be made, and
Step 5: Commit to making critical decisions
Steps 4 and 5 in Rosenthal and Kouzmin’s (1997) framework involve how quickly to make
communication decisions and then committing to them. While prompt decision-making may
be uncommon in public  organizations,  if  an incident  is  highly uncertain  or complex,  the
government must respond to it as quickly as possible. And when the incident escalates, the
government must commit to making critical decisions to avert or contain the incident at even
a shorter notice. In this case, the public announcement delay and poor containment effort,
which  resulted  in  more  reported  deaths  and  mounting  complaints,  indicated  that  the
government and Ms. Kim Tien also failed at these steps. Readers’ harsh comments could be
seen in every article on this case. For example,  one reader commented to Nam Phuong’s
(2014a) article in VnExpress:
The health sector responded too slowly and passively during this epidemic. Just like in the
vaccine  case,  there  is  no  effective  measure  to  stop  the  spread,  no  information,  no
announcement to public.
Altogether, it could be seen that the measles outbreak was undermined by the government. It
was not taken as seriously as it should have been, resulting in mounting criticism and case
escalation.
The health scandals collectively escalated into a government crisis
When the measles outbreak scandal escalated, it was grouped with the prior health scandals
to deliver a collective judgment on the minister’s dedication and efficiency. To see if the case
turned from a scandal to a government crisis, this paper used Lee’s (2009) eight challenges
that characterize a government crisis to examine the media articles as below.
(1)  The  issue  demonstrates  the  government’s  ineffectiveness  in  crisis  prevention  and
containment.
In this case, the government’s ineffectiveness was shown in the inconsistency, and sometimes
contradictions, between the official announcement and the reality of the outbreak. At first,
Ms. Kim Tien kept assuring the public that there was no outbreak and everything was under
control. However, just before she finally admitted to the presence of an outbreak, the number
of  confirmed  deaths  due  to  measles  suddenly  went  up  five  times  compared  to  the  prior
confirmed number (from 25 to 111) (Lan Anh, 2014a). It was reported on the media that the
minister did not want to display her inefficiency so she kept the number low.
(2)  The  issue  magnifies  the  government’s  existing  problem  in  public  communication
management.
This challenge was demonstrated in the case as the minister lacked communicating with both
the media and the public, since during the first week of the measles scandal, she didn’t make
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any comments. The lack of a spokesperson or proper communication training for the minister
was also a problem, as her replies were mostly perceived negatively by the public.
(3) The government faces intensified media scrutiny.
Little media relation effort in this case heightened the media scrutiny on the minister. The
mounting pressure for her resignation came not only from the general public but also from
the media workers. Many media reports have implied that Ms. Kim Tien should step down
while the online petition had gone viral on social media and her containment effort did not
succeed.  For  example,  the  article  “Vietnam  health  minister”  (2014)  in  Tuoi  Tre  News
included the following question from a journalist:
“As a mother, have you extended your apology to the parents whose children have died of
measles, and have you thought of resigning?”
 (4) The handling process recalls collective memories of previous crises.
During her official meeting with the People’s committee, Ms. Kim Tien was asked several
times about the previous cases of medical ethics. In response to the doubts that the Ministry
could not improve the situation, Ms. Kim Tien was hesitate to say that she “could make no
promise when these issues could be stopped” (Le Kien, 2014).
(5) The issue is perceived as a thematic, regular happening.
Health scandals and lack of communication from the minister began to seem normal to the
Vietnamese public. Many concerns were sent to the media regarding the minister’s time and
again ineffectiveness over the scandals:
Upsetting! I never saw Ms. Head-of-health-industry made condolences to the victims, and
never did she have an immediate plan to thoroughly settle the problems, from the vaccine
case to the present measles, and hopefully no more cases (Lan Anh, 2014b).
 (6) The communication management is reflected as the government’s commitment to the
public good.
According  to  Lee  (2009),  the  communication  effort  is  perceived  as  the  government’s
commitment to the public, as through communication, the government can guide the people
on how to protect themselves during crises. However, the lack of communication throughout
the outbreak displayed just the opposite.  A number of readers voiced their anxiety to the
press, as they believed the government didn’t care for people’s lives.
America has the early warning outbreak recognition system, while Vietnam ironically fears
that the people will panic (so we waited for more deaths before confirming the outbreak). The
old saying "prevention is better than cure" is already thrown away (Lan Anh, 2014a).
 (7) The issue magnifies the bureaucratic nature of the government.
The bureaucratic nature of the Vietnam government, especially the Ministry of Health, was
shown through its inflexibility and poor communication among government agencies. During
the early phase of the outbreak, there were inconsistencies in announcements among the local
health  agencies,  and  between  the  locals  and  the  Ministry.  The  number  of  deaths,  the
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seriousness of the infection, and the need to announce the outbreak were reported differently
by different officials, which greatly confused the public (Lan Anh, 2014b).
(8) The political, economic and social contexts affect the government’s decision.
According to Ms. Kim Tien, one of the reasons that the Ministry could not announce the
outbreak  earlier  was  the  political  context.  Different  government  agencies  functioned
independently  and the  Ministry of  Health  could  not  speed up the  announcement  process
(Nam Phuong, 2014b). Even though this explanation did not improve the situation, it showed
that external environment might have affected this case.
To review,  RQ1 aimed  to  understand  whether  the  examined  health  scandals  collectively
escalated into a government crisis. Altogether, the data demonstrated all eight challenges that
characterize a government crisis. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Minister of Health
failed to  properly assess the measles  outbreak that  it  added to the previous scandals and
escalated into a government crisis.
The minister’s responses during the crisis
Benoit  (1995)  emphasized  that  maintaining  a  positive  image  is  an  important  aspect  of
communication. However, as human beings, people cannot always avoid making mistakes, or
satisfy everyone. If the government has to admit fault, they can apply one of Benoit’s five
image restoration strategies, as listed below, to minimize damage and return to a favorable
position.
(1)  Denial:  The  accused person simply  denies  performing  the  act  or  shifts  the  blame to
another person.
(2)  Evading responsibility:  The  person attempts  to  evade  or  reduce  the  responsibility  by
stating that the act was to respond to another (wrongful) act, or that s/he lacks the information
and control over the act, or that the act was done with good intentions.
(3) Reducing offensiveness: The person tries to reduce the negative feeling of the audience by
stressing the (person’s) good traits, emphasizing that the act was not serious or offensive,
putting the act in another context,  reducing the accuser’s credibility,  or compensating the
victims.
(4) Corrective action: The person vows to solve the problem.
(5) Mortification: The person admits responsibility and apologizes.
Among Benoit  (1995)’s  five  image  restoration  strategies,  mortification  is  favored  by the
public, followed by reducing offensiveness and corrective actions. Benoit (1997) and Novak
and Barrett  (2008) made a suggestion that the person at  fault should admit  responsibility
immediately, because denying or evading it can backfire and cause more damage when the
truth  emerges.  Additionally,  during  the  public  communication  process,  the  researchers
recommended that the spokesperson should be more flexible with diverse public needs, and
more passionately involved, showing empathy and concern for the people, instead of trying to
reduce offensiveness or making empty pledges of corrective actions or mortification (Xiao,
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2008;  Novak  &  Barrett,  2008).  It  was  emphasized  throughout  the  literature  that
communication should not only be politically appropriate, but also publicly acceptable.
The first news stories about the minister and the health scandals in October 2013 all reported
that she “firmly denied media access” and walked away when asked about the issues (Mai
Huong, 2013). Da Trang (2013) further described the media’s thought of this reaction in her
article as “[the journalists] could only look at each other in disbelief, [when the minister],
“who  should  have  been  the  one  to  take  the  initiative,  shook  her  head  and  refused  [the
interview].” Regarding the minister’s reaction, a reader commented:
Reading this article is a sad thing. The Ministry head refused to talk; the authorities didn’t
talk either. It’s sad. This is not just a medical ethics issue, but also an insensitive and immoral
case (Mai Huong, 2013).
When she finally accepted media interviews, during the earlier scandals, Ms. Kim Tien used
denial and  evading responsibility  to defend herself. On the vaccine scandal that led to the
infants’ deaths, the minister denied that it was a health-related scandal, as “there was no proof
[that  the Hepatitis  B shots  were to  blame]”  (Bich Van, 2013).  Later,  speaking about  the
doctor’s body disposal case, she did not take the responsibility to see through the issue as the
head of the Ministry of Health. Instead, she victimized herself as an innocent person during
the whole issue, that she was clearly lacking control over the problem, stating she “cannot
imagine that a doctor like [him] could take such a heartless action” (“Minister speaks out,”
2013). Moreover, Ms. Kim Tien tried to shift the blame to other parties. According to Mai
Huong (2013), the minister only talked a little on medical ethics but implied that all of health
scandals became more noticeable because of the media. Stating that Vietnam journalists were
so active nowadays that they covered a lot  of negative news, the minister  suggested that
media  should  have  proper  orientation  to  cover  other  positive  stories.  The  minister  also
applied guilt to the health departments and private clinics, not to any particular individual
within the Ministry,  as Tuoi Tre News reported that “she also blamed the death partly on
loose management and control of concerned agencies over health facilities, especially private
ones.”(“Minister speaks out,” 2013).
The other  strategy that  Ms.  Kim Tien  used  was  corrective,  displaying  major  changes  to
prevent the scandal recurrences. From November 2013 to March 2014, it was shown on the
media that the minister began to train health workers on medical ethics and etiquette and
conducted regular check-ups on hospital facilities. In addition to the corrective actions, the
minister also expressed her pain, torment and upset over the decline of medical ethics (Mai
Huong,  2013;  L.  Anh,  2013).  However,  such expressions  were  not  well  received  by the
public, as many considered those false sympathy.
Ms. Tien is making an empty statement. When something happens, the adage is always “We
are extremely pained and tormented” (Da Trang, 2013).
There is no need for the minister to be upset anymore; the whole society has been upset
already. The minister only needs to act. All talk and no action is meaningless. (L. Anh, 2013)
During  the  measles  outbreak  in  April  2014,  Ms.  Kim Tien  continued  using  denial,  and
employed  more  of  the  reducing offensiveness strategy,  combined with  showing empathy.
Even  though  the  Ministry  was  late  in  confirming  the  outbreak  and  providing  proper
containment directions, Ms. Kim Tien attempted to convince audiences that the outbreak was
not as bad as it might appear. According to V. V. Thanh (2014), the minister assured the
public that there were enough facilities and medicines to fight the outbreak, and the health
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sector also had plans to lessen the financial burdens to poorer patients. As the minister tried
to alleviate the seriousness of the case, she refused to resign despite the growing petition. She
said:
As a mother, I would like to send my deep condolences to all parents whose children have
died of measles. […] But sincerely speaking, I don’t think of a resignation at this moment.
Currently, the entire health sector is focusing all efforts on saving children from dying from
measles (“Vietnam health minister,” 2014).
Nevertheless, the late actions from the minister diminished the reducing offensiveness efforts.
Since the outbreak spread out quickly, the last minute containment and apology were deemed
disappointing by the mass. For example, a reader commented that:
Why are you “afraid” of confirming the outbreak? Confirmation is needed so we can get
prepared. Are you afraid of being called ineffective? Why aren’t you afraid of your people
dying? (Lan Anh, 2014b).
RQ2 aimed to see how the minister’s responses affected her reputation to the public during
the examined health scandals.  From the data,  it  could be seen that altogether,  during the
earlier scandals, Ms. Kim Tien employed the two least favored image restoration strategies,
which  are  denial and  evading responsibility.  She then moved on with two more  favored
strategies,  corrective  action and  reducing  offensiveness.  However,  the  strategy  of
mortification, or admitting responsibility and apologizing, was never used by the minister.
She also engaged some sympathy in the responses, but when taken together with the timing
and unfavorable strategies used, the sympathy was considered insincere and fake. Therefore,
it was concluded that her responses to the scandals did not help her win back public trust but
damaged her reputation instead.
Public relations (PR) efforts in Vietnam government
As the poor communication seems to be the reason for the escalation of these scandals and
for  reputation  damage,  this  research turned to  seek for  a  solution  for  the  government  in
general, and Ms. Kim Tien in particular.
In their research on crisis communication in the public sector, Horsley and Barker (2002)
found out that many government organizations do not have enough resources to effectively
implement a crisis management plan, nor do they have the budget to hire PR consultants.
Lack  of  professional  strategic  planning  in  communication  plays  down  the  government’s
effectiveness in dealing with a crisis, thus making the government more vulnerable to public
scrutiny.
The role of PR in a government crisis is essential in all crisis stages. According to Liu and
Levenshus (2013), to better prepare for a potential crisis, a PR consultant team can help with
environmental  scanning,  issue  management,  relationship  management,  and  crafting  and
practicing a crisis management plan. During the responding phase, the PR team should offer
government officials much knowledge of the print, broadcast and online media so that the
officials  can control  interactions  with the media and own the information.  Sadow (2013)
further  suggested  that  the  team  should  also  recommend  and  train  the  organization’s
spokesperson to increase the credibility and reputation. Liu and Levenshus (2013) added that
after the crisis is contained, the team can help follow-up the information and action from the
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public, as well as evaluate the whole process for the government to reflect. As the world is
more  connected  and  the  media  evolves,  PR  skills  become  an  important  asset  in  a
government’s communication efforts, especially in times of crisis.
Despite all of the advantages to contain a crisis that PR can offer, the Minister of Health in
particular,  and  the  Vietnam  government  as  a  whole,  still  undermines  the  PR  crisis
management effort in the government body. In Vietnam, the government’s communication
efforts  cover  a  number  of  activities,  from  propaganda,  public  announcements,  press
conferences,  party  meetings  and  publicity  to  social  responsibility  and  public  education.
Nevertheless, according to Ngo (2012), the government’s crisis management is not currently
effective, since a number of crises have badly damaged the government’s reputation before
both domestic and international publics, and even escalated to public tensions, destabilizing
the economy, politics, the social order and security.
Therefore, this paper found an urge to insist that a PR role in the government body should be
stressed. In Vietnam, politicians underestimate the role of communication and PR. According
to Lan Huong (2014a), they choose to approach an issue reactively instead of proactively, and
speak on their own accord instead of consulting a media relations professional.  However,
with the current commotion, it is arguable that this old approach should be changed, and PR
can give more insight to politicians on how to deal with the media and the public. As a
resolution to the crises and reputation management, this paper assessed the current PR role in
a government crisis, what benefits it can offer and if it could be better utilized to uphold the
government’s reputation. It is suggested that PR is what the government needs to deal with
situations like the aforementioned scandals.
5. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
This research sees two limitations.  First,  it  only looked at  the traditional media and their
readers’ comments as data for the study, and ignored the social media dynamics of the case.
While the petition for the minister’s resignation went strong online, a social media analysis
could shed new knowledge into the case and the public agenda. Second, the qualitative nature
of this research presented some limitation on the reliability and validity of the results, as the
study relied  solely on  the  investigator’s  interpretation.  It  is  suggested  that  future  studies
include social media to make the data more complete, as conduct a quantitative approach to
the case to increase the result’s validity and representativeness.
6. CONCLUSION
The study concluded that the Vietnam Minister of Health underestimated the importance of
the many health scandals in 2013-2014 since they eventually escalated into a government
crisis.  Additionally,  her  poor  strategies  to  respond  to  the  public  further  damaged  her
reputation and created appeals for her to step down. The study suggested that PR is what she
and other Vietnam government officials need to properly deal with such scandals. However,
more research with social media data and a quantitative approach is called for to increase the
reliability  and  validity  of  this  case’s  results.  Until  now,  as  the  health  issues  and  the
resignation appeals are still needed, the crisis management effort should get more attention
from the government, and such study is needed to better understand the situation.
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